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Intersecting Challenges: Mothers and Child Protection Law in BC 
 
By Judith Mosoff, Isabel Grant, Susan B. Boyd, and Ruben Lindy
*
 
This paper is concerned with how courts in British Columbia adjudicate applications by the state to remove children 
permanently from their parents, usually their mothers. Overwhelmingly, these cases are about single mothers who 
experience mental disability and addiction, domestic violence, and poverty.  Indigenous women are overrepresented 
in our sample.  The intergenerational effects of the child protection system also are clear as many of the mothers in 
our study were themselves raised in state care.  The paper highlights the degree to which judges blame women for 
the precarious circumstances in which they live, which are often a product of austerity measures adopted by states. 
Courts describe these circumstances as being a function of poor “lifestyle choices”, thus obscuring the role of the 
state in protecting women from violence, providing safe housing and supporting mothers and children with 
disabilities. Particularly troubling is the finding that courts are appear to be more willing to sever the relationship 
between mothers and their children where those children are themselves identified as having “special needs”.  
Judges are quick to assume that a child will be “better off” in state care even in the face of evidence that the child 
protection system in British Columbia has woefully failed both children and their mothers.   
 
 
  
                                                     
*
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Introduction 
 
This paper is concerned with how British Columbia courts adjudicate applications by the 
state to remove children from their parents, especially their mothers. It is inspired by Professor 
Judith Mosoff, who examined child protection decisions in British Columbia over two decades 
ago, finding that women with mental disabilities tended to lose their children on the basis of 
psychiatric opinion that appeared to apply an implicit presumption against their fitness as 
parents.
1
  She identified the interplay between “scientific” psy-discourses and ideological 
expectations of motherhood as key factors. Professor Mosoff re-visited and broadened this field 
of research more recently, hoping that the world had changed over the last 20 years in ways that 
could affect the issue. Due to her illness and untimely death in December 2015, her co-authors 
made it a priority to complete and write up her research. The study examines child protection 
decisions in British Columbia, which overwhelmingly are about single mothers who experience 
mental disability,
2
 addiction, male violence and poverty.  Indigenous mothers are 
overrepresented, which is not surprising given the inter-generational impact of removing children 
from families and communities.  
Several developments have occurred since the early 1990s when Professor Mosoff 
conducted her initial research. On a positive note, in 2010 Canada signed the UN Convention on 
                                                     
 
 
1
 Judith Mosoff, “Motherhood, Madness, and Law” (1995) 45:2 UTLJ 107 [Mosoff, “Motherhood, Madness, and 
Law”]. See also Judith Mosoff, “‘A Jury Dressed in Medical White and Judicial Black’:  Mothers with Mental 
Health Histories in Child Welfare and Custody” in Susan B Boyd, ed, Challenging the Public/Private Divide: 
Feminism, Law, and Public Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) at 227 [Mosoff, “A Jury”]. 
2
 We use the term mental disability broadly to include developmental disabilities, psychiatric disabilities, and other 
related mental health labels that may be seen as relevant to a person's ability to parent. Mental disability is the 
language of the equality guarantee in section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and in most 
human rights legislation. See: Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 15, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
3
 a treaty that emphasizes the inclusion of people with 
disabilities in all aspects of life and entitlements to the necessary accommodations that facilitate 
inclusion. Article 23 specifically guarantees people with disabilities the right to family life, the 
right to appropriate supports in raising children, and provides that no family should be separated 
simply because a child or a parent has a disability.
4
 As well, the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission has drawn attention to the dire consequences of the residential school system for 
indigenous communities, families, and children in Canada.
5
 In May 2016, Canada officially 
adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
6
 
At the same time as these human rights developments, an overall and arguably 
accelerating decline in social welfare benefits has occurred during an era of changing economic 
policies worldwide. These cutbacks correspond to the values of the neoliberal state, which 
emphasize personal or individual (rather than collective) responsibility and risk prevention.
7
  
                                                     
3
 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 13 December 2006, 189 UNTS 137 [CRPD]. 
4
 For example, Article 23 on Respect for home and the family states, inter alia: 
 
2. States Parties shall ensure the rights and responsibilities of persons with disabilities, with 
regard to guardianship, wardship, trusteeship, adoption of children or similar institutions, 
where these concepts exist in national legislation; in all cases the best interests of the child 
shall be paramount. States Parties shall render appropriate assistance to persons with 
disabilities in the performance of their child-rearing responsibilities. 
… 
4. States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or her parents against 
their will, except when competent authorities subject to judicial review determine, in 
accordance with applicable law and procedures, that such separation is necessary for the best 
interests of the child. In no case shall a child be separated from parents on the basis of a 
disability of either the child or one or both of the parents. 
(CRPD, supra note 3). 
5
 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future: Summary of 
the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (Winnipeg: Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of Canada, 2015) 
<http://www.myrobust.com/websites/trcinstitution/File/Reports/Executive_Summary_English_Web.pdf> accessed 3 
June 2016 [Truth and Reconciliation Report]. 
6
 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 61/295, UNGAOR, 61st Sess, Supp No 49, UN Doc 
A/RES/61/295, (2007); “Canada officially adopts UN declaration on rights of Indigenous Peoples”, CBC News (10 
May 2016) online: CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca/news/aboriginal/canada-adopting-implementing-un-rights-
declaration-1.3575272>. 
7
 This trend began in the 1970s but has accelerated with neoliberal restructuring of the welfare state since the early 
1990s. See, e.g., Brenda Cossman & Judy Fudge, eds, Privatization, Law, and the Challenge to Feminism (Toronto: 
These values interact problematically with the ideological expectations placed upon mothers to 
ensure the health and well-being of their children.
8
 Mothers are expected to be selflessly 
available to their children. If possible, they should take responsibility for the primary care of 
their children in the context of a two parent family (preferably heterosexual) that is premised on 
female dependence upon a breadwinner (usually male).
9
 Many mothers find it difficult to meet 
this normative expectation of the selfless, full time mother and, certainly, most mothers in our 
study experienced challenges that made it very difficult for them to do so. A majority were single 
mothers with no reliable partner to assist them financially. The men that they were involved with 
were rarely viewed by judges as ideal father figures. As a result, the women were reliant on the 
ever-shrinking welfare state if they were not able to find work that also permitted them to 
adequately care for their children, a challenge in a country with inadequate daycare.  
The retraction of state responsibility and emphasis on personal responsibility have serious 
ramifications for women who need state support to raise their children. The expectations of 
personal responsibility are particularly problematic for mothers with mental disabilities, as they 
are seldom able to meet the demands of autonomy and selflessness due to poverty as well as the 
need to meet the requirements of the mental health system.
10
 Moreover, as we shall see, risk 
assessment is an important part of modern child protection in British Columbia. Yet the ideology 
of risk can distort and deflect attention away from the relations of race, class and gender that are 
                                                                                                                                                                           
University of Toronto Press, 2002); Janine Brodie, “The New Social “isms”: Individualization and Social Policy 
Reform in Canada” in Cosmo Howard, ed, Contested Individualization (New York: Palgrave MacMillan US, 2007) 
153; Shelley AM Gavigan & Dorothy E Chunn, “From Mothers’ Allowance to Mothers Need Not Apply: Canadian 
Welfare Law as Liberal and Neo-liberal Reforms” (2007) 44:4 Osgoode Hall LJ 733. 
8
 Barbara Ehrenreich & Deirdre English, For Her Own Good: 150 Years of the Experts’ Advice to Women (London: 
Pluto Press, 1979); Susan P Penfold & Gillian A Walker, Women and the Psychiatric Paradox (Montreal: Eden 
Press, 1983). On child protection, see Marlee Kline, “Complicating the Ideology of Motherhood: Child Welfare Law 
and First Nation Women” (1993) 18 Queen's LJ 306 [Kline, “Complicating the Ideology of Motherhood”].  
9
 See, for more detail, Susan B Boyd, “Motherhood and Law: Constructing and Challenging Normativity” in 
Margaret Davies & Vanessa E Munro, eds, The Ashgate Companion to Feminist Legal Theory (Farnham, Surrey: 
Ashgate, 2013) 267 at 268-270 [Boyd, “Motherhood and Law”]; Kline, “Complicating the Ideology of 
Motherhood”, supra note 8 at 301-311. 
10
 Mosoff, “A Jury”, supra note 1 at 238. 
structured into child protection processes. Poor, single mothers especially are constructed as a 
“risk class”, “who can legitimately be intruded upon, scrutinized indefinitely and held to account 
for their daily activities”.11 Similarly, the experience of indigenous mothers reveals a history of 
colonialist and racist processes of regulation of indigenous families, yet child protection law 
tends to erase this history through the supposedly neutral application of the best interests of the 
child standard, the key legal principle in child protection law.
12
  
 Another change since Professor Mosoff’s early 1990s work is that the incidence of 
children labelled with “special needs” has increased, especially diagnoses in ADHD and autistic 
spectrum disorder. This expansion has been a source of significant controversy within the 
psychiatric system.
13
  As we shall see, the coincidence of a mother with a mental disability and a 
child with “special needs” arises not infrequently in the case law, and identification of a child as 
“special needs” often makes it more difficult for the mother to retain custody.  
This paper argues that despite positive developments such as the ratification of the CRPD 
and the greater attention to indigenous families, mothers encounter major challenges in the child 
                                                     
11
 Karen Swift, “Risky Women: The Role of Risk in the Construction of the Single Mother” in Shelley AM Gavigan 
& Deirdre E Chunn, eds, The Legal Tender of Gender: Law, Welfare and the Regulation of Women’s Poverty 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010) 143 [Karen Swift, “Risky Women”].  
12
 Kline, “Complicating the Ideology of Motherhood”, supra note 8. 
13
 One study found that the prevalence of childhood disability has grown by 15.6% between 2001 and 2011: Amy J 
Houtrow et al, “Changing Trends of Childhood Disability, 2001-2011”(2014) 134:3 Pediatrics 530.  It is difficult to 
identify precise rates of autism because different sources present different numbers.  What is clear, however, is that 
there has been a significant increase in the number of children with this diagnosis.  Autism has been described as 
“skyrocketing” to an estimated rate of 1 child in 100: Benedict Carey, “New Definition of Autism Will Exclude 
Many” (19 January 2012), The New York Times, online: <www.nytimes.com>. The CDC has found that the rate of 
diagnosis for autism in children has increased from 1 in 150 children in 2000 to 1 in 68 in 2012: Center for Disease 
Control and Prevention, “Autism Spectrum Disorder: Data and Statistics” (31 March 2016), online: 
<www.cdc.gov>. See also: Hélène Ouellette-Kuntz et al, “The changing prevalence of autism in three regions of 
Canada” (2014) 44 J Autism Dev Disord 120 in which researchers found average annual percent increases in 
prevalence among children 2 to 14 years of age ranging from 9.7% to 14.6%.  
The CDC also reports that “Rates of ADHD diagnosis increased an average of 3% per year from 1997 to 2006 and 
an average of approximately 5% per year from 2003 to 2011”: Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 
“Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD): Data and Statistics” (15 March 2016), online: <www.cdc.gov>. 
Another study found that the rate of ADHD diagnosis in children and teens increased by 43% between 2002 and 
2011: Kathy Fackelman, “New Report Finds 43% Increase in ADHD Diagnosis for US Schoolchildren” (8 
December 2015), George Washington University Milken Institute School of Public Health ,online: 
<http://publichealth.gwu.edu/content/new-report-finds-43-percent-increase-adhd-diagnosis-us-schoolchildren-0>. 
protection system, in large part as a result of cutbacks to material supports. If anything, social, 
political and legal changes have had a negative effect on those caught up in this system. Despite 
an increase in procedural safeguards for those at risk of losing their children to the state, at the 
stage in the process where a court must consider whether to make a final order that severs a 
parental relationship, the answer is still yes in a large majority of cases. Ideologically, mothers’ 
rights are often constructed as oppositional to the rights of their children, which undermines the 
connection that exists between them. This oppositional construction can also result in women 
being defined as failing to adequately protect their children, even if a risk to the child is 
generated by factors largely outside the woman’s control, such as poverty or a violent partner.14  
Both scenarios feature frequently in the cases we reviewed. 
Identifying the problematic effects of the ideology of motherhood does not, of course, 
answer all questions posed in child protection law, although it is important to read the 
jurisprudence with these ideological currents in mind. Professor Mosoff emphasized in her 
earlier work that criticism “of how the child protection process works to disadvantage women 
with mental health histories is not meant to suggest that protecting children is not crucially 
important” nor that “any mother, regardless of her actions is entitled to remain a custodial parent 
with no intervention by the state or other entities.”15 Inevitably in some circumstances a parent 
will be unable to provide a safe environment for children.  The safety of children is paramount 
and sometimes will mean severing parental ties.  These difficult cases often involve women in 
extremely challenging circumstances.  For many, violence and substance abuse permeate their 
lives and extreme poverty and lack of safe housing are facts of life.  Very often their children 
                                                     
14
 Kline, “Complicating the Ideology of Motherhood”, supra note 8 at 301-311. 
15
 Mosoff, “Motherhood, Madness, and Law”, supra note 1 at 111. 
have behavioural and other challenges that keep families under constant scrutiny by child 
protection authorities.   
Despite these harsh realities, we believe that more efforts can and must be made to keep 
children with their mothers.  Our project is to interrogate the negative ways that structures, 
policies and attitudes about gender, poverty, male violence and disability infuse judicial analysis 
and ask whether some factors inappropriately limit the ability of mothers to retain their status as 
parents. The discourse in these cases suggests courts, social workers, and other helping 
professionals frequently fail to examine the role of socio-economic structures in constructing 
mental disability and the barriers to parenting it creates. Instead women are blamed for problems 
like their lack of housing and the violence inflicted against them by men. As Professor Mosoff 
observed, mothers with mental disabilities have historically been perceived by law to be like 
children, so it is often more difficult to see them as capable of taking caring of their own 
children.
16
 In fact, with proper social and material supports, they might well be able to do so 
more often. The questions of how much and what kind of support should be provided looms 
large in this paper.   
The paper proceeds as follows. We first explain the law reform history and legislative 
framework that form a backdrop to our case law study.  We then present the findings from our 
case law study.  Several themes that emanate from the case law are discussed, including poverty 
and single motherhood, the construction of disability, the intersection of a child’s “special needs” 
with maternal disability, domestic violence and, finally, the obligations on the state to provide 
material resources to women to enable them to parent.  The overrepresentation of Indigenous 
women is woven throughout our discussion.  The conclusion offers the insights drawn from our 
study and argues that, if some of the conditions under which the mothers in our case law study 
                                                     
16
 Ibid at 113. 
struggle could be dealt with constructively, through material supports, fewer families would face 
the devastating impact of child apprehension.  We also conclude that judges should be more 
cautious about immersing a child into the foster care system without scrutinizing the limits and 
dangers of that system. 
The Statutory Framework 
 
In British Columbia, the child protection regime is governed by a lengthy and complex statute, 
the 1996 BC Child, Family and Community Services Act (CFCSA).
17
 Its enactment followed a 
law reform process that was intended to create a modern child protection statute that would 
emphasize family autonomy and limit state intervention, a philosophy that was already being 
followed to a considerable extent by social workers.
18
 Ultimately this philosophy was diluted by 
a greater emphasis on child safety, largely due to a high profile child death at the hands of his 
mother,
19
 which also put more pressure on social workers to identify and avert risky situations.  
As is typical for “modern” child protection statutes, the CFCSA includes far more 
significant procedural safeguards (including limits on the duration of various orders) for parents 
than the previous legislation had offered. As Hall explains, however, the statute embraces two 
contradictory visions, a family-centred approach and a child-centred approach.
20
 For example, 
the Guiding Principles state, inter alia, that (b) “the family is the preferred environment for the 
                                                     
17
 Child, Family and Community Service Act, RSBC 1996, c 46 [CFCSA]. We discuss here only the provisions most 
salient to our inquiry. 
18
 Margaret Hall, “A Ministry for Children: Abandoning the Interventionist Debate in British Columbia” (1998) 12:2 
Int'l JL Pol'y & Fam 121 [Hall, “A Ministry for Children”]. 
19
 Hon Judge Thomas Gove, Gove Inquiry into Child Protection, Final Report Vol. 1, Matthew's Story. Vol 2, 
Matthews Legacy (Victoria: Queens Printer, 1995). Andrew Armitage, “Lost Vision: Children and the Ministry for 
Children and Families” (1998) 118 BC Studies 93 at 92, 102-104; Hall, “A Ministry for Children”, supra note 18; 
Hester Lessard, "The Empire of the Lone Mother: Parental Rights, Child Welfare Law, and State Restructuring" 
(2001) 39:4 Osgoode Hall LJ 717.  See also Isabel Grant & Judith Mosoff, “Supporting our Families, Protecting 
Children”, Vancouver Sun (8 December 1995) A19. 
20
 Hall, “A Ministry for Children”, supra note 18 at 137. 
care and upbringing of children and the responsibility for the protection of children rests 
primarily with the parents” and (c) “if, with available support services, a family can provide a 
safe and nurturing environment for a child, support services should be provided”.21 These 
principles could be interpreted to encourage mothers to raise their children with appropriate 
support services (but only if “available”). However, other important Guiding Principles 
emphasize that “children are entitled to be protected from abuse, neglect and harm or threat of 
harm” and the section starts out stating that the Act “must be interpreted and administered so that 
the safety and well-being of children are the paramount considerations”. The section outlining 
factors relevant to a child’s best interests similarly emphasizes safety alongside other factors.22 
Another significant law reform was an expansion of the grounds on which a child may be 
found in need of protection, which is the crucial first step in a child being removed either 
temporarily or permanently. Specifically, children can now be found in need of protection if 
there is a risk of future harm, whereas previously the harm must have already occurred. For 
example, a child needs protection if the child has been, or is likely to be, physically harmed 
because of neglect by the child's parent.
23
 The risk-based inquiry increases the need for social 
workers (and judges) to predict future harm and mental disability, poverty and domestic violence 
inevitably play an important role in these risk assessments. The test to be applied for risk of 
future harm is lower than that used to determine past harm.
24
 The focus on future harm has 
resulted in the adoption of standardized risk assessment models, a practice that has been the 
                                                     
21
 CFCSA, supra note 17 at s 2 [emphasis added]. 
22
 Ibid at s 4.  
23
 Ibid at s 13(1)(d) [emphasis added]. 
24
 BS v British Columbia (Director of Child, Family and Community Services), (1998) BCJ No 1085 at paras 27-30; 
British Columbia (Superintendent of Family & Child Services) v GC, (1989) BCJ No 1577 at para 38; British 
Columbia (Superintendent of Family and Child Services) v BM, (1982) BCJ No 468 at para 27. 
subject of considerable criticism from social workers and researchers.
25
 Because mental illness 
or intellectual impairments are seen as risk factors for future harm, using these models is likely 
to have a particular impact on parents with mental disabilities.
26
 Once identified, such parents 
will be viewed with stricter scrutiny. The case law also reveals an overrepresentation of children 
labelled as "special needs", another complicating factor to the risk calculation. Since these 
children may have been identified as being at higher risk by other state systems, such as 
education and health, there is heightened surveillance on these families. 
A child is also in need of protection if the child’s parent is unable or unwilling to care for 
the child and has not made adequate provision for the child’s care.27 According to Pivot Legal 
Society, this is the most commonly cited reason for removal of a child, at 47% followed by 
neglect at 25%.
28
  The CFCSA also includes a “failure to protect” ground, so that a child will be 
in need of protection if they have been, or are likely to be, “physically harmed, sexually abused 
or sexual exploited by another person and if the child’s parent is unwilling or unable to protect 
the child.”29 Even more specific is a section stating that a child is in need of protection if he or 
she is “emotionally harmed by living in a situation where there is domestic violence by or 
                                                     
25
 See e.g. Ronald C Hughes & Judith S Rycusa, “Issues in Risk Assessment in Child Protective Services” (2006) 
1:1 Journal of Public Child Welfare 85; Stan Houston & Huw Griffiths, “Reflections on Risk in Child Protection: Is 
it Time for a Shift in Paradigms?” (2000) 5:1 Child & Family Social Work 1; Sheryl Brissett-Chapman, “Child 
Protection Risk Assessment and African American Children: Cultural Ramifications for Families and Communities” 
(1997) 76:1 Child Welfare 45; Karen Swift & Marilyn Callahan, At Risk: Social Justice in Child Welfare and Other 
Human Services (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009) [Swift & Callahan, “At Risk”]. See also Pivot Legal 
Society, Broken Promises: Parents Speak about B.C.’s Child Welfare System (Vancouver: Pivot Legal Society, 
2008) at 84-89, online: 
<http://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/pivotlegal/legacy_url/310/BrokenPromises.pdf?1345765642 > [Pivot Legal 
Society, Broken Promises]. 
26
 British Columbia, Child Protection Consultation Services, The Risk Assessment Model for Child Protection in 
British Columbia (Victoria: Ministry for Children & Families, Child Protection Consultation Services, 1996). There 
appears to be no more recent copy of this document. See Karen Swift and Marilyn Callahan articles about risk 
assessment models from the perspective of social workers: Swift & Callahan, “At Risk”, supra note 25. On single 
mothers and risk assessment, see Karen Swift, “Risky Women”, supra note 11 at 143.  
27
 CFCSA, supra note 17 at s 13(1)(h). 
28
 Pivot Legal Society, Broken Promises, supra note 25 at 87, 89, 97.  
29
 CFCSA, supra note 17 at s 13(1)(c). 
towards a person with whom the child resides.”30 A mother who is perceived to have failed to 
protect her child by continuing to live with an abusive man, perhaps due to poverty or lack of 
housing options, can find her child removed as a result, even if she is not herself abusive. 
A new Ministry for Children and Families (now the Ministry of Children and Family 
Development) was also introduced in 1996. This Ministry has primary responsibility under the 
CFCSA to keep children safe and it merged various functions of child protection and family 
support that had previously been carried out by several Ministries. The rationale was to create a 
seamless system of assistance for those families that needed help in raising children and a 
watchfulness for those children who could be in peril. In line with many other public entities in 
the era of neoliberalism, the Ministry shifted to a model of practice where efficiency was 
paramount. The overall result is that family support and child protection are now officially 
intermingled, with an emphasis on efficient processes and formal accountability. This change 
does not seem to have resulted in a positive experience for mothers, in part due to the challenges 
that budgetary cutbacks generate for social workers themselves, due to high caseloads.
31
  
Psychiatrists, public health nurses, homemakers, social workers, and parenting course 
instructors all have dual roles in the child protection system.
32
 On the one hand, these workers 
provide support, services or treatment to a mother and/or her children. On the other hand, they 
are potential witnesses against the mother in child protection proceedings. Such professionals are 
often seen as better qualified than the mother herself to describe her life, her challenges, her 
ability to parent and the needs of her children.  While judges do not qualify such persons as 
formal experts, they are often treated as de facto experts, especially in comparison with the 
mother.  Rarely is there a case when a witness adverse to the mother’s interest did not start out as 
                                                     
30
 Ibid at s 13(1)(e)(ii). 
31
 Pivot Legal Society, Broken Promises, supra note 25 at 60-71. 
32
 Ibid at 61-62. 
someone providing assistance, making receipt of services, often necessary for successful 
parenting, a double-edged sword.
33
 Yet, as we shall see, judges seldom interrogate the conflicted 
roles of the personnel working within those systems who are the providers of services, those with 
the authority to terminate services and those who later give evidence in applications to terminate 
the parental relationship.
34
 Moreover, many of the supports that this personnel provide are “soft” 
supports (e.g. parenting education) rather than material supports (e.g. housing, respite care) that 
might make it more possible for socio-economically marginalized families to keep their 
children.
35
 As a result, the modern non-interventionist child protection statutes protect familial 
autonomy far less than they should.
36
 
People with mental disabilities, especially when they are poor, already have a higher 
level of contact with state agencies, services and health professionals than people without 
disabilities. The need to rely on services has implications for many aspects of an individual’s 
life, but particular effects arise in the child protection context. Despite the fact that a diagnosis of 
mental disability is probably a poor predictor of parenting capacity,
37
 parents with mental 
                                                     
33
 See e.g. Callie Westad & David McConnell, “Child Welfare Involvement of Mothers with Mental Health Issues” 
(2012) 48 Community Ment Health J 29 [Westad & McConnell, “Child Welfare Involvement”]; Leslie Doty 
Hollingsworth, “Child Custody Loss Among Women with Persistent Severe Mental Illness” (2004) 28:4 Social 
Work Research 199 [Hollingsworth, “Child Custody Loss”]. 
34
 This too was an issue in Mosoff’s earlier research: Mosoff, “Motherhood, Madness, and Law” supra note 1 and 
Mosoff, “A Jury”, supra note 1.  For a notable exception, see British Columbia (Director of Family and Child 
Services) v FC, 2004 BCPC 531 at para 18 [Director v FC], where the judge was very critical of the Director for 
having stopped trying to provide supports for the mother once the decision was made to seek a CCO. Nonetheless 
the judge did go on to grant a CCO with unsupervised access to the mother. 
35
 On the significance of housing as a material support, especially to marginalized people, see: Paula Goering et al, 
National At Home/Chez Soi Final Report (Calgary, AB: Mental Health Commission of Canada, 2014). 
36
 Luther makes this point in the Nova Scotia context, emphasizing the difference between material and other 
supports: Ilana Luther, On the “Poverty of Responsibility”: A Study of the History of Child Protection Law and 
Jurisprudence in Nova Scotia (PhD Thesis, Dalhousie University, 2015) online: 
<dalspace.library.dal.ca/handle/10222/61015> at Chapter 5 [Luther, “Poverty of Responsibility”].  
37
 Carol Mowbray, Daphna Oyserman, Deborah Bybee & Peter MacFarlane, “Parenting of Mothers with Serious 
Mental Illness: Differential Effects of Diagnosis, Clinical History, and other Mental Health Variables” (2002) 26:4 
Social Work Research 225 at 237. 
disabilities are more likely to be investigated by child protection authorities.
38
 They are also 
more likely to lose custody of their children.
39
  
Until 2013, under the CFCSA, the main way that parents could lose permanent custody of 
their children was through continuing custody orders (CCOs), under which the Director becomes 
the sole personal guardian of the child and may consent to the child’s adoption.40 A CCO can be 
made at two different stages in child protection proceedings. Section 41 allows for a CCO to be 
made at a protection hearing, in rare circumstances such as when the identity or location of a 
parent cannot be found and is not likely to be found; a parent is unable or unwilling to resume 
custody; or the nature and extent of the harm the child has suffered or the likelihood that the 
child will suffer harm is such that there is little prospect it would be in the child’s best interests 
to be returned to the parent.
41
 Section 49 allows the Director to apply to a court for a CCO not 
sooner than 60 days before a temporary custody order (which would more commonly be ordered 
at a protection hearing) expires. The court must order continuing custody if, for instance, a parent 
is unable or unwilling to resume custody of the child
42
 and it “may” order continuing custody if 
there is no significant likelihood that the circumstances that led to the child’s removal will 
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40
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improve within a reasonable time or that the parent will be able to meet the child’s needs.43 In 
rare circumstances, a CCO can be cancelled if the circumstances have changed significantly and 
cancelling the order is in the child’s best interests.44Access may be granted to a parent 
notwithstanding a CCO, although it is often denied to facilitate adoption
45
 and normally 
terminates if the child is adopted by anyone other than a family member.
46
 
If a court does not make a CCO, section 49(7) requires it to either return custody of the 
child to the parent, order that the child remain in temporary custody of another person for a 
specified period of up to six months, or order that the child be in temporary custody of the 
Director for a specified period up to six months. The latter two orders are sometimes referred to 
colloquially as “last chance orders”. 
Our Study 
 
Our study examines all reported judgments in applications for continuing custody orders 
(CCOs) under the BC CFCSA from January 2002 to June 2015.
47
 We chose these judgments as 
our focus for several reasons. First, as a matter of law, child protection files in BC are sealed to 
protect the privacy of families, making reported decisions the only easily accessible window into 
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how courts apply child protection legislation to families.
48
 Second, CCOs represent a final step in 
what is sometimes a long history of dealings between parents and the Ministry. Most of the 
children at issue in these cases have been in and out of state care for a considerable period of 
time.  At no point in the process are the stakes higher for children and families because CCOs 
terminate the legal relationship between a child and parent (almost always) permanently. They 
have been described by one American scholar as the “death penalty of civil cases.”49 The CCO 
hearings constitute the final opportunity for parents to challenge the state in a formal venue. 
Reported CCO cases thus allow us to explore the circumstances under which a court is willing to 
permit this profound intervention into the lives of children and parents. Finally, while not 
without their limitations,
50
 studies of judicial discourse offer an important insight into how 
attitudes are shaped and reflected at a critical site in the child protection process.  
The CCO cases themselves do not tell us how the system operates as a whole,
51
 nor the 
sometimes unseen processes through which parents may eventually lose custody. For example, 
                                                     
48
 We recommend Pivot Legal Society, Broken Promises, supra note 25 to anyone who seeks an understanding of 
processes leading up to a CCO hearing, based largely on the stories of mothers who have gone through such 
processes. 
49
 Stephanie Gwillim, “The Death Penalty of Civil Cases: The Need for Individualized Assessment & Judicial 
Education When Terminating Parental Rights of Mentally Ill Individuals” (2009) 29 Saint Louis U Pub L Rev 341. 
50
 Reported cases may not be representative of most cases that reach the courts. Moreover, the facts presented in 
reported decisions “are but one telling of the factual narrative.” Fiona Kelly, “Enforcing a Parent/Child Relationship 
at All Cost?: Supervised Access Orders in the Canadian Courts" (2011) 49:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 277 at fn 47. Judges 
often report facts selectively and that the judgment ultimately produced for the public is just one telling of the 
factual narrative. For a discussion and application of the usefulness of judicial discourse, see Isabel Grant "Intimate 
Partner Criminal Harassment through a Lens of Responsibilization" (2015) 52:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 557 at 572 [Grant, 
“Intimate Partner Criminal Harassment”]. On the selectiveness of judicial narrative, particularly in the context of 
male violence against women, see Elizabeth Sheehy, "Causation, Common Sense, and the Common Law: Replacing 
Unexamined Assumptions with What We Know about Male Violence against Women or from Jane Doe to Bonnie 
Mooney" (2005) 17 CJWL 87.   
51
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<http://www2.gov.bc.ca/assets/gov/family-and-social-supports/services-supports-for-parents-with-young-
parents may make voluntary agreements to receive support services such as counselling or 
respite care
52
 or to give temporary care of the child to the Director. Although these agreements 
are time limited, the legislation permits renewal for various periods, so a child could be outside a 
parent’s care under a voluntary agreement for a considerable time, even years. Once a CCO is 
granted, the Director becomes the sole personal guardian of the child and may consent to the 
child’s adoption.53 A parent can also consent to various orders, including a CCO,54 in which case 
a court does not need to find that the child is in need of protection and the parent is not viewed as 
admitting any of the grounds alleged for removal of the child.
55
 
While our study is not a complete representation of all CCOs during this period, the cases 
show us how judges balance the various factors listed in the legislation and how the best interests 
of the child principle is interpreted alongside other principles, such as the concern to keep 
children with families where possible. 
An Analysis of BC Child Protection Jurisprudence 
Key Characteristics of the CCO Cases  
 
We do not purport to offer a quantitative analysis of the 85 reported CCO decisions that we 
found,
56
 but several observations can be made about them.
57
 First, these cases are 
                                                                                                                                                                           
children/reporting-monitoring/04-accountability/04-2-open-protection-
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 In some of these cases a family member is also seeking custody of the child(ren) in the same proceeding. See for 
example WMW v JW, 2011 BCPC 360 [WMW v JW], British Columbia (Director of Child, Family and Community 
Service) v GM, 2012 BCPC 175 [Director v GM], D v D, 2013 BCPC 135 [D v D]. 
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Scotia.  See Luther, “Poverty of Responsibility”, supra note 36. See also Pivot Legal Society, Broken Promises, 
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overwhelmingly gendered.  Although it is difficult to count precisely how many "single mothers" 
were involved,
58
 many of the women had very fluid relationships, in the sense that men were in 
and out of their lives and not a stable presence in the mother’s or the child’s life. If we consider 
women who are responsible for raising their children in the absence of a stable male partner in a 
paternal role as being “single mothers”, then a large majority of the cases involve single mothers, 
a fact rarely noted by judges.  Often when fathers are also named in the application, they take no 
part in the hearing.  Given that mothers generally bear the brunt of caregiving work, and that 
caregiving work is undervalued, these responsibilities appear to be taken for granted.
59
 Much 
less, if anything, is expected of fathers.
60
  Some of our cases involve two parents, but only rarely 
was the only party to the application a single father.
61
 Instead of focusing on the challenges faced 
by a woman raising children alone, judges were more likely to criticize her for her poor choices, 
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 In British Columbia (Director of Family and Child Services) v AH, 2002 BCPC 355 [Director v AH] the 
application was made to apprehend two children from their single father. The father had muscular dystrophy and had 
multiple health challenges. In British Columbia (Director of Family and Child Services) v CD, 2002 BCPC 462 
[Director v CD] the father sought to have custody of two of his children returned to him and the mother supported 
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such as the men with whom she associates and her lifestyle, especially where addiction is a 
factor. No same sex parents appeared in the sample.   
Second, poverty is pervasive in these cases, often overlapping with disability, as not only 
are persons with mental health issues among Canada’s poorest citizens, but poverty itself is a risk 
factor for poor mental health.
62
A large majority of the cases involved a woman raising children 
in conditions of extreme economic disadvantage and social marginalization, consistent with other 
data that shows that apprehensions occur more often in poor families
63
 headed by lone mothers.
64
 
Many women were struggling to raise several children on very low levels of support.  
Third, maternal mental disability and/or addiction issues are prevalent in these cases and 
play a significant role in judicial decision-making.  In 63 of 85 cases (74%), the primary 
respondent was labelled as having a mental disability
65
 and in one case the primary respondent 
was a father with a physical disability. In an additional 14 cases, the primary respondent was 
labelled with a substance abuse issue. In 31 cases (36%), the primary respondent was labelled 
with both a mental disability and a substance abuse disorder.  Thus in only eight cases (9%) was 
the primary respondent labelled with neither a substance abuse problem nor a mental disability.  
Addiction in these cases is not usually characterized as a disability but rather as a lifestyle 
choice.  
Fourth, 48 cases (56%) involved at least one child who was identified as having “special 
needs” and courts appear to be more willing to sever these relationships on the basis that children 
with special needs demand not only competent, but exceptional, parenting.   
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 This is consistent with the Canadian Incidence Study on substantiated maltreatment, ibid, which tells us that 91 
percent of primary care givers in substantiated maltreatment cases are women.  
65
 Some of these respondents also had physical disabilities in addition to the mental disability. 
Fifth, violence in various forms was very prevalent in these cases.  More than half of 
these cases involved male violence against the mother (54%).
66
 Male violence against children 
was present in 18% of cases
67
 and mothers were violent against children in 9% of cases.
68
 While 
men are only occasionally primary respondents at CCO hearings, they nonetheless loom large in 
the reasons issued by judges, usually as a problem for mothers seeking to retain custody. Fathers 
and/or boyfriends are usually not a consistent presence in the children’s lives and, in fact, are just 
as likely to be seen as threats either because they are violent to the mother or because they are 
involved with selling drugs or other criminal activity. The typical response of the child 
protection system to cases where male violence or criminality creates a risk to the child is to 
displace children by removing them from the mother because they are not safe from a male 
threat.  This threat is construed as being against the child only; little concern is demonstrated 
about the ongoing danger to the mother. 
Sixth, Indigenous mothers are overrepresented in these CCO cases. In 23 of the 85 cases 
(27%), the primary respondent was identified as Indigenous, probably an underestimate as this 
fact may not be mentioned in every decision and our count only includes cases where an explicit 
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reference to indigeneity was made.  It is estimated that up to 60% of children in care in British 
Columbia, including through voluntary agreements, are Indigenous.
69
 More broadly, Canada has 
a long history of child apprehensions of indigenous children who, historically, were often taken 
from their families and their communities and placed for adoption with nonindigenous families.
70
 
In response to this history, the current statute requires courts to consider the importance of 
preserving a child’s cultural identity in assessing the best interests of the child, although it does 
not mandate a particular outcome.
71
  
Seventh, the inter-generational impact of state control over the families who are subject 
to CCO applications is demonstrated by the number of respondents who were themselves 
children in care.  Roughly 30% of the mothers in this sample had been children “in care,”72 
challenging the notion that children who are apprehended will necessarily fare better once 
removed from their parent. In addition, many of these women had lost multiple children to prior 
child apprehension proceedings.
73
   
Finally, and most significantly, a large majority of the mothers had their relationships to 
their children severed by the court.  In 63 of the 85 cases (74%) CCOs were granted for at least 
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one child.
74
 Of the 22 remaining cases, the children were returned to the mother in seven cases, 
left in the temporary custody of the director in six cases and left in the temporary custody of a 
family member in three cases.  In the remaining six cases, custody was granted to another family 
member.
75
  By the time the cases made it to this final stage, the result often appeared to be 
almost inevitable.  We now turn to an examination of the judicial discourses in the cases. 
Analysis of Judicial Discourse 
(i)  The Challenges of Poverty and Single Motherhood: More Than a “Lifestyle” Choice? 
 
In many of the cases, judges rely heavily on what they refer to as poor "lifestyle" choices 
or "chaotic lifestyles" that are incompatible with parental responsibilities.
76
 Lifestyle choices in 
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these cases may include anything from drug addiction,
77
 unstable or lack of housing,
78
 civil 
commitment,
79
 family violence, and even poverty.
80
 In SH, for example, in granting the CCO, the 
court stated: 
The key factor which gives rise to current protection concerns for this 11 month 
old infant is the mother's failure to accept that there were, and continue to be, 
risks to her child's safety related to her history of drug use and her lifestyle 
choices. Those choices have resulted in instability, family violence, financial 
difficulties, lack of regular or appropriate health care, and a highly nomadic 
existence of living in vessels, hotels, or latterly in a Winnebago trailer home.
81
 
The court’s suggestion that the violence and poverty experienced by the mother were a result of 
“lifestyle choices” posits a false notion of choice for many of these women and suggests a failure 
to appreciate the broader context of the mother’s life.  
If a mother's circumstances are explained in terms of choices, she is more likely to be 
portrayed as immature and self-involved rather than as someone dealing with very difficult life 
circumstances. Constructing mothers as autonomous subjects, whose life circumstances are the 
consequences of their own freely made choices, also helps provide a sense of justice being done 
in cases which otherwise often admit of no easy answers. However, where poverty, spousal 
abuse, and disability are key aspects of the mother’s experience, casting responsibility on her for 
systemic issues largely beyond her control obscures the constraints that circumscribe her agency.  
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It places blame on the mother as an individual while failing to sufficiently scrutinize the role of 
government and society in constructing the barriers these mothers face and in failing to provide 
adequate assistance to surmount them. The problem with framing systemic problems in the 
language of “lifestyle” choices was described succinctly by Marlee Kline: 
Altogether, the characterization of battering and alcohol and drug dependency as 
personal problems reinforces the placing of blame for child neglect on the 
deficiencies of individual mothers, and obscures the roots of the difficulties First 
Nation mothers face in more systemic oppressive relations including historical 
and continuing colonialist and racist practices.
82
 
 
Judges are not always insensitive to the systemic nature of the issues facing the parents 
appearing before them. Nevertheless, even women’s significant efforts to improve their 
circumstances and so-called “lifestyle” choices may not prove to be enough to retain custody of 
their children.  In ST,
83
 for example, the mother had successfully completed a year-long parenting 
course and witnesses from that course testified to the significant improvements she had made as 
well as her recent willingness to seek out support from social services and from her own mother.  
Despite this testimony supporting the mother’s position, a CCO was ordered based on a number 
of factors such as her need for stable housing, her ongoing use of marijuana and cigarettes in the 
child’s presence, and a lack of cleanliness in the home.  The judge said to the mother after 
granting the CCO: 
I have now spent the better part of seven court days dealing with the life of a 19-
month-old child and her 28-year-old mother.  I have heard from the mother what 
her life has been like. I want her to know that I admire all that she is done to 
better equip her to be a good mother.  I have concluded that she is sincere in her 
wish to be a good mother. She has suffered so many disadvantages in her life 
that I have concluded that she does not now have the ability to safely and 
effectively care for her daughter. Other people, who also care about her daughter 
will be given that responsibility so that she can grow up healthy and secure. I 
hope that [the mother] will be reassured and even be somewhat comforted by the 
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fact her daughter has been and will be well cared for and will likely have 
opportunities in her life that [the mother] was never given.
84
 
 
Not only is this woman told that her extraordinary efforts to improve her “lifestyle” fall short, 
she is also expected to be grateful to the Ministry for finding a better home for her daughter.  
This mother is expected to be so “selfless” that she can be comforted by her child being taken 
from her care. 
(ii) The Construction of Mental Disability 
 
As we have noted, mental disability is an important intersecting factor in many of the 
cases we studied. Despite increasing societal acceptance of the rights and ability of people with 
mental disabilities to be parents, the medical model of disability
85
 continues to serve as the 
dominant paradigm through which mothers with mental disabilities are understood in child 
protection decisions.
86
 While mental disability is not, in and of itself, a reason for terminating a 
parent’s relationship with her child, it continues to be treated as a risk factor at crucial stages of 
the child protection process.
87
 It is consistently portrayed in negative terms, as an individual 
affliction, frequently obscuring the role of society in constructing the barriers mothers with 
disabilities face and failing to assist mothers in confronting the challenges of parenting, for 
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example by alleviating poverty and providing services. Perhaps contradictory to the medical 
model, however, women are also blamed for their mental disability, as if it were a matter of 
personal choice, rather than a function of other indices of social disadvantage such as poverty 
and addiction, and their own experience in the child protection system as children.  
Many women in these cases have been given multiple diagnoses throughout their contact 
with the child protection and mental health systems.  These labels often trigger high levels of 
state surveillance and some women have never been given the opportunity to interact with their 
children except in the presence of social workers.
88
 Personality disorders, such as borderline 
personality disorder
89
 or dependent personality disorder,
90
 are frequently included in the list of 
diagnoses given to these women.
91
 These labels are disproportionately attached to women and 
suggest that these women have struggled to cope with their social circumstances, or to escape 
abusive and controlling relationships. Feminist scholars have argued that the DSM definitions of 
these disorders are gendered both in their criteria and in their application.
92
 Dependent 
personality disorder, for example, has been referred to as little more than a “caricature of the 
traditional female role.”93 These disorders are supposedly lifelong conditions and do not lead to 
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any type of treatment, but rather act as descriptors of what is construed as women’s inadequacy 
in coping and, in the context of child protection, their inadequacy to parent.  
Many of these women were themselves children in care, apprehended from their own 
mothers, and left to struggle through the foster care system.
94
 The impact of this kind of 
childhood not surprisingly leads to diagnoses that label the woman as having poor impulse 
control or an excessive need for nurturance. Others have had their children taken from their care 
at birth, which can affect both the woman’s ability to present herself as a competent mother and 
also her mental health status.  For the Indigenous mothers, in particular, state involvement in 
their families and communities may extend back generations. Furthermore, because personality 
disorders are seen as lifelong, even where a woman has taken steps to improve her functioning, 
judges may doubt her ability to maintain those gains.  In RD,
95
 for example, where a mother had 
left a violent relationship, the judge noted that the personality traits which led her to the 
unhealthy relationship had not changed and therefore that the child was at risk in the future.
96
 In 
another case, the hearing featured conflicting testimony about whether the mother suffered from 
schizotypal personality disorder.
97
  If that diagnosis were substantiated, the judge indicated that it 
would be determinative of her future ability to parent: “[i]f the mother does suffer from that 
disorder, then it is highly unlikely that she would ever be able to significantly improve her 
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parenting abilities.”98 If the diagnosis of depression were correct, by contrast, then there was 
hope that the mother could learn to parent.
99
 Such labels are far from neutral. 
The intersection between disability and idealized constructions of motherhood can be 
seen in various different ways throughout the case law. Women with disabilities are infantilized 
and construed as insufficiently self-sacrificing. These traits, in turn, make them unfit mothers. 
Critical disability and legal scholars have convincingly demonstrated that across a range of 
discourses, women with mental disabilities are often constructed as needy, dependent, childlike 
and asexual.
100 
Representatives of the Director, psychologists and judges continue to label 
mothers with mental disabilities with descriptors such as naïve, dependent, immature or 
childlike. Such descriptors stand as markers for the absence of qualities expected of mothers, 
such as the ability to assume independent and autonomous responsibility for a child.  By existing 
in opposition to normative understandings of what makes a fit mother, the “child stereotype” 
accorded to these women naturalizes the eventual termination of their legal rights to be 
parents.
101
 Children cannot parent children and thus, by implication, nor can those who are 
“childlike”.  
It is not uncommon to see women described with multiple child-like characteristics, such 
as “friendly but self-absorbed”, “alarmingly” and “amazingly” naïve, and “psychologically much 
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younger than her years.”102 Mothers are described as being “prone to emotional role reversals 
with [their] children” and as confusing their “own emotional needs with the needs of [their] 
children”.103 RM104 involved a mother who had grown up in a polygamist community and 
experienced incest, sexual assault, forced marriage and other ongoing abuse as a child.  She had 
been labelled with a number of personality disorders, many of which focused on her obsessive-
compulsive behaviour in parenting. The mother was described as overly-dependent on the 
support of others and analogized to a child.  The judge noted that “throughout this trial that she 
often had her head resting upon a support person, or even her lawyer, much the way that a child 
would rest her head upon a parent.”105 The mother was involved in a class-action lawsuit against 
the Bountiful community and the judge was concerned that she may “fall back into her own 
world with poor mental health and poor parenting” worrying that this lawsuit could lead to “the 
possible waxing and waning of the mother’s mental health.”106 
This tendency to infantilize mothers with disabilities is particularly acute for women with 
intellectual disabilities.  Not uncommonly, they are described as having the mental age of a child, 
thus raising the spectre of a child raising a child, even though they are grown women with life 
experiences that no child could possibly have.
107
 In one case where the children were removed in 
part because of the mother’s “low intellectual functioning”,108 the court equated the candidness 
of her testimony, presumably a good thing, with her being "quite childlike”.109 In TN, the mother 
who had “significant cognitive and intellectual difficulties” was described variously as 
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“emotionally immature” by the Ministry social worker, and presenting as “emotionally and 
cognitively younger than her stated age” by the author of the parenting capacity assessment.110  
Related to the childlike and dependent stereotype is the construction of the mother as 
self-involved and incapable of placing her children’s needs before her own.111 The self-involved 
mother can be contrasted with the ideal of the selfless mother who is expected to disregard her 
own needs to meet those of her children, even at great cost to herself. Courts frequently describe 
mothers with mental disabilities as being unable to place their children’s needs before their 
own.
112
 For instance, in RM, where the mother had been raised and abused in a polygamist 
community, the court stated:   
All the children have obviously suffered significant neglect and emotional abuse as a 
result of their mother being unable in the past to put her children's needs ahead of her 
own personal needs.
113
 
 
The inability to overcome addiction, to separate from an abusive partner, or to comply with the 
plans made by mental health professionals are seen as a function of a mother being selfish.  
Troubling assumptions about personal agency and choice are often at the heart of these 
descriptors.  
The cases reveal that mental disability is seen as permanent and often immutable.  Yet 
research indicates that parents with developmental disabilities can become skilled parents so long 
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as support services are appropriately geared toward their needs.
114
 Judges rarely connect the 
labels of mental disability with the devastating social circumstances in which many of these 
women find themselves.  In AM,
115
 the mother was a young woman with an intellectual 
disability.  Her child had been identified as having special needs such that “a highly competent 
caregiver with considerable intellectual and emotional resources”116 would be required.  One 
expert described the results of the mother’s psychological testing as follows:  
She displays herself as someone who is probably chronically unhappy, 
pessimistic and resentful.  The testing indicates someone who feels alienated 
from the world, and has difficulty in meeting responsibilities.  She is likely to be 
insecure, but self-centred, demanding of attention, but at the same time 
complaining about others not meeting her needs, being at fault for her 
difficulties.
117
 
 
The mother was described as functioning at a grade 3 level and much was made of her difficulty 
with reading. There was no acknowledgement that she had almost certainly encountered 
significant social barriers given her disability and that alienation and resentment are not 
surprising for a woman in her circumstances.  There was no evidence of any drug use, violence 
or physical harm to the child.  Despite the “many positive things” about her parenting, including 
her patience with her child, she was simultaneously described as emotionally needy, immature 
and narcissistic.
118
 The experts appeared to agree that this mother could learn additional 
parenting skills but that the challenge would lie in generalizing those skills to new situations.  An 
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assisted parenting arrangement was considered not viable in this case.  Instead a CCO was 
granted and the mother was denied access because it might have made adoption more difficult.   
 Once a label gets attached to a woman it is very difficult for her to portray herself as a 
competent mother.  Where she struggles to overcome the challenges that led to the labels 
initially, she may be construed as selfish and unwilling to put her child’s needs before her own.  
Difficult circumstances such as being raised in an abusive, dysfunctional family or being raped 
as a teenager may be dismissed as everyday “stressors” of life.119 There is little scrutiny on the 
part of judges when a woman is presented as having multiple, sometimes contradictory, labels by 
different experts.  The social challenges these women face as a result in part of living with these 
psychiatric labels are used as evidence to prove that the labels themselves are legitimate.  As we 
will see in the next section, these barriers are multiplied when the child is identified as having 
“special needs”.  
(iii) Children with Special Needs  
 
The prevalence of children with “special needs” in Canada’s child protection systems has 
been well documented.
120
 For example, the most recent Canadian Incidence Study on Child 
Abuse and Neglect (2008) found that in 46 per cent of substantiated child maltreatment cases “at 
least one child functioning issue was indicated.”121  As we noted earlier, a significant proportion 
of CCO cases we reviewed (48 of the 85 cases (56%)) involved one or more of the children 
being identified as having “special needs” of some kind. Numerous examples appear of the 
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Director arguing that the special needs of the child warrant a CCO.
122
  Of course, considering the 
specific needs of a child and the parent’s capacity to parent is not itself problematic. In assessing 
a child’s best interests, courts are required to consider “the child's physical and emotional needs 
and level of development”.123 However, the frequency with which the combination of the 
mother’s mental disability and the child’s “special needs” is cited as a key reason for 
permanently terminating their relationship underscores that despite the CFCSA’s disability-
neutral language, the child protection system continues to operate as a significant barrier to 
women with mental disabilities, especially where their children are identified as having “special 
needs”. 
The past 20 years have seen a dramatic increase in children diagnosed with "special 
needs” in Canada, especially those related to learning disabilities, attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder and/ or autism.
124
  While some applaud the trend towards the naming of new disorders, 
more accurate and early diagnosis, development of new drugs, and innovative therapeutic 
interventions in education and rehabilitation,
125
 others are more critical of the rising numbers.
126
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How a child’s particular challenges factor into decisions about severing of the parental 
relationship is revealing both in terms of what it says about motherhood and about disability. 
While many scholars have shown the ubiquitous nature of mother blaming in relation to family 
problems,
127
 there is a particular significance to blaming mothers in relation to child disability. 
Importantly, the decisions link the child’s challenges to the mother, in a way that holds her 
responsible.  Sometimes a particular diagnosis is intrinsically linked to what the mother has or 
has not done prenatally or after birth. Labels given to children such as reactive attachment 
disorder,
128
 abstinence syndrome,
129
 and fetal alcohol spectrum disorder
130
 implicate mothers 
directly.  Mental health labels that are linked to affection, discipline or nurturing are inevitably 
the mother’s fault.  Yet it is not surprising that children are labelled as having attachment 
disorders when many of them have been separated from their mothers from early infancy and 
have interacted with their mothers only in supervised settings.
131
 Others have been in and out of 
state care multiple times over their short lives.  Yet none of their symptoms are attributed to the 
actions of the state, only to those of the mother.   Mothers are expected to be loving, selfless, and 
totally concerned with their children both before and after birth so that any risks taken during 
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pregnancy challenge the idea that she could be a good mother.
 132
 Where problems are traced to 
the prenatal environment, the mother is always held responsible, regardless of what part the 
father played in the culture of alcohol and drugs.   
The lens of judicial discourse allows us to see not just that “special needs” children are 
overrepresented, but also how the presence of the child’s “special needs” informs the arguments 
made in favour of CCOs. In particular, the constructions of disability in the mother and child 
intersect, often leading to the conclusion that mothers with mental disabilities are especially 
unsuited to meet the needs of their children with “special needs”. We focus on two aspects of the 
cases in which courts conclude that mothers lack the above-average level of skill required to 
parent such children. 
First, in some cases, the mother is told that, but for her child’s “special needs”, the child 
would have been left in the mother’s care. In other words, the mother is not labelled as inherently 
unfit to parent a child but only unfit to parent a child with “special needs”. In TR,133 for instance, 
the mother was described as having “obvious deficits” and, while never tested, the court 
speculated that she might share the same genetic condition as two of her children.  The Director 
acknowledged that she had “significantly improved” since the apprehensions of three other 
children, but stated that she still did not “have a complete understanding of how the world 
works” because she took her child on a “not at all well thought out” bus trip to the United 
States.
134
 Significantly, the court expressly stated it would have given the mother another chance 
but for the child’s special needs: 
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This child is no longer a baby.  If this child were of average or better 
intelligence, it seems likely, for several reasons, that the Court would have given 
her mother another chance to raise her daughter.  First, this mother is not and 
has not been violent or abusive to this child.  The strongest case that the Director 
could make in regard to abuse was that the mother was overly strict in enforcing 
overly strict rules with this child.  However, the Court finds no sufficient 
evidence that the mother’s actions towards this child have, at any time in the last 
many years, been sufficient to amount to grounds for permanent removal of this 
child on the basis of actual abuse or neglect.  Second, the mother can follow 
directions.  So long as she receives any help from our society whatsoever, she 
would be able to make reasonable plans for ordering her daughter’s days and 
would be able to follow through with them.  Third, a child of average or better 
intelligence would not need the extra support that a special or high needs child 
would.  
 
There are many more reasons why, at this point in time, at this point in this 
mother’s life and development and at this point in the child’s life, that the Court 
would be much more disposed to return the child to the mother’s care were it not 
for the fact that this child is a high needs/special needs person.
135
 
 
Not only did the court speculate that, had the child not had “special or high needs” the mother 
could have retained custody, it also indicated that, if the existing foster parents were not able to 
adopt the child, then the child should be returned to the mother’s care:  
Notwithstanding anything else set out in these reasons for judgment, this Court 
would return the child to the mother’s care if the Court understood that the 
Director’s plan was to place the child for a stranger adoption; and adoption out 
to yet another new set of parents in yet another home, probably in yet another 
school.
136
  
 
The judge realized that leaving the child with the mother would be a better option than a stranger 
adoption, thus acknowledging that the mother was capable of parenting this child.  Only because 
there was a better offer on the table – dedicated foster parents willing to adopt – was the 
relationship severed.  The child’s disability gave the court permission to weigh competing homes 
for the child to determine which one would be better. Further support surely should have been 
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explored to see if the child’s exceptional needs could have been met with exceptional support. 
Instead, a CCO was determined to be in the child’s best interest.137 
 Second, and often overlapping with the first concern, some decisions separate the child 
with special needs, allowing the mother to retain custody of the “typical” children but not of the 
child with “special needs”, thus isolating that child from his or her family connections. This 
approach again suggests that the mother is a capable parent, but not an extraordinary parent who 
can provide the additional care to meet the “special needs” of her child.  
For example, in BG and VK,
138
 the Director sought a CCO for two toddlers. The Director 
had “longstanding” concerns with the mother’s low intellectual functioning and the father’s 
aggression and hostility.
139
 The older child is described as a “healthy two-year-old girl with little 
in the way of special requirements” while the younger child “at 16 months is four to five months 
globally delayed, with constipation problems and hypotonia”.140 With respect to the older child, 
the court found that there was insufficient evidence that the parents would not be able to meet his 
needs in a reasonable time. It concluded, however, that the parents would not be able to meet the 
younger child’s special needs within the foreseeable future: 
Before he was fed pureed food through some sort of a sucking apparatus.  Now 
his foster mother chops everything to the size of one-third of a grain of rice so 
that he will not choke.  It is obvious that D.K. will require continuous medical 
care, as well as occupational therapy, physiotherapy and likely speech 
therapy.  The extraordinary effort taken by the foster parents just for feeding 
make it clear that D.K. requires specialized care, a quality of care which is 
simply beyond the capacity of his parents now and for the foreseeable future.  In 
this regard, I have considered the plan of care and the child's best interests, and 
have no alternative but to make a continuing custody order for D.K.
141
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As a result, a CCO was granted for this child, whereas only a temporary custody order was 
granted with respect to the child without “special needs”. While efforts are often made to keep 
siblings together, this goal was clearly not a priority in the decision.  
MB highlights the dilemmas courts face when asked to separate siblings with “special 
needs”. 142 In this case, a CCO was sought for eldest two children with “special needs” to remove 
them from their Indigenous mother but not for the youngest child, an infant, who did not have 
“special needs”. The court describes the mother as having a dysfunctional and abusive 
upbringing, during which she spent time in foster care and had her first child at 14. She had 
struggled with substance abuse and abusive relationships and was described as having borderline 
intellectual functioning. The Director relied on an expert report emphasizing that the mother’s 
“special needs” children required above-average parenting abilities that the mother lacked.  
I think M.B. would not be capable of successfully dealing with the challenges 
and stresses of raising three normal children. M.B. is almost certainly not 
capable of parenting an infant as well as two children whose special needs 
require greater than average parenting abilities. If M.B. were to parent her three 
children, it is unlikely that she would be able to obtain enough support on an 
ongoing basis over many years to prevent her from relapsing into destructive 
modes of coping.
143
  
However, the expert report indicated that she could adequately parent the infant child without 
special needs, noting that she “has shown diligent efforts to improve herself, avoid substance 
abuse, develop her parenting skills, and reach out for support.”144 
At the time of the trial, the infant daughter continued to reside with the mother while the 
older two daughters lived together in a foster placement with a non-Indigenous family that was 
eager to adopt. The court described this placement in a way that highlighted the economic 
advantage of the foster parents, with whom the children were “now very attached”: 
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The foster home is wonderful-the kind of home any child would love to live in, 
with a huge swimming pool and a back yard playground that would rival the 
playground of many schools. The foster mother aggressively advocates for the 
special needs of the children. The foster parents have gone so far as to pay out of 
their own pocket for the oldest child to attend a private school to better address 
her special needs. Both foster parents are actively involved in the parenting of 
the children.
145 
The mother in this case had a strong network of support from her local aboriginal community, 
which was concerned that she had not been given a fair opportunity to regain her two children at 
least in part because she was Indigenous. The community believed that social workers had 
already made their minds up to have the girls adopted by the foster family and thus did not take 
unsupervised access seriously even though the mother had met their conditions for obtaining 
such access.  The judge was explicitly critical of the Ministry and recognized that the Ministry’s 
behaviour was what led to a lack of cooperation on the part of the mother who felt that nothing 
she did would be good enough to satisfy the Ministry.
146
 
In the midst of the hearing, the court granted unsupervised access.  Apparently during the 
course of her testimony, the mother appeared to become more trusting. In stark contrast to the 
suggestion that she had “limited cognitive abilities,”147 it became clear that “she could be very 
articulate when she felt comfortable in her surroundings.”148 The court noted the 
“metamorphosis” the mother had undergone and described her as an excellent parent for her 
youngest child. Nonetheless a CCO was granted with respect to the eldest child, who had 
expressed a desire to remain with the foster family. The court found that the relationship between 
the daughter and the mother was so damaged that it would be like “being thrown back into the 
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vortex of a tornado”149 to return her to the mother. This tornado had been caused at least in part 
by the child protection system.  
There were a number of positive aspects to this judgment.  The court recognized the 
enormous progress the mother had made, criticized the Ministry for failing to live up to its side 
of the agreement, and refused to grant a CCO for the middle child. The judge also acknowledged 
that judges should be cautious about using poverty as a basis for ordering a CSO: 
Poverty brings with it a certain level of potential risk to children. 
Unquestionably the mother needed to be taught that there were more proper 
interim measures that could be taken to heat the trailer, such as getting a 
temporary electric heater from the band. But this is all in the context of a mother 
who was raised as a child in a tent in the bush where the only source of heat was 
an open fire. The court must be careful not to overemphasise protection 
concerns that are primarily rooted in poverty, otherwise a significant portion of 
our population would be deemed to be in need of protection.
150
  
 
 
Ultimately, however, the middle class benefits provided by the foster home loomed large in the 
decision to terminate the mother’s relationship with her oldest daughter with special needs.  
Foster families, especially those seeking to adopt, can create a conflict for a court. The 
issue should not be whether a mother is the best option for a child but rather whether the 
maternal relationship can, with support, be maintained for the child. Yet where the children have 
been in foster care for some time, the deck may be stacked against the mother even if she has 
made significant progress in putting her life together.
151
 The “best interests of a child” principle 
should not provide a licence to look for the “best home” for a child. 
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These cases are particularly striking in light of the fact that, as judges acknowledge, 
children with extensive “special needs”, particularly older children, are difficult to place for 
adoption and more likely to remain in foster care indefinitely.
152
 As a result of their “special 
needs” these children do not just lose their mothers, but also potentially their siblings, their 
grandparents and other extended family members. As we discuss later, these cases highlight the 
critical role played by material supports. If a mother is fit to raise her “typical” children, it seems 
likely that extensive support would allow her to care for a child with “special needs”.  As we 
suggest in our conclusion, judges should be given more power to require the state to provide 
necessary supports.  What makes it more difficult to parent a child with a disability is that more 
resources, of all kinds, may be required.  Families with significant economic resources are able 
to purchase necessary services that support the particular needs of the child and provide 
assistance to the parents.  They are also likely to be more effective advocates for themselves and 
their children and are not subjected to the sort of surveillance that poor families will be if they 
receive publicly funded services. As a result, some parents are more likely to be able to maintain 
their parent-child relationship than others, based largely on class. 
 In general, the additional “burdens” that come with parenting a “special needs" child in a 
society not equipped to support that mother are expected to be borne by that mother alone. The 
mother is held responsible for any limitations in her caregiving and only so much support is 
available before a child will be removed.  It is rarely acknowledged that the foster parent system 
involves significant costs as well as significant risks.   
(iv) Male violence against women 
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Violence was prevalent in the lives of the women in our sample.  As mentioned above, 
over half of our cases involve male violence against women (46 of 85 or 54%).
153
 In 15 cases 
(17%), men were either physically or sexually violent (or both) against children.  Perhaps 
surprisingly, there was not a great deal of overlap between male violence against women and that 
against children, with only five cases involving both.
154
 All but one of these 15 cases (93%) led 
to a CCO.
155
 There were allegations of violence committed by the mother in eight cases (9%), all 
but one of which resulted in a CCO.
156
  Many of the mothers had also been victims of various 
forms of violence as children. In this section, we focus on male violence against women because 
of its prevalence in our study and because of the problematic aspects of removing children 
because their mother is a victim of violence.
157
   
Section 13(1)(c) of the CFCSA deals with what is sometimes called “failing to protect.” It 
provides that a child is in need of protection if they have been, or are likely to be, “physically 
harmed, sexually abused or sexually exploited by another person and if the child's parent is 
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unwilling or unable to protect the child.”158 The provision that deals most directly with children 
witnessing spousal abuse provides that a child is in need of protection if he or she is 
“emotionally harmed by living in a situation where there is domestic violence by or towards a 
person with whom the child resides.”159 Our sample contains numerous cases of the Ministry 
seeking a CCO at least partly on the basis of a woman “failing to protect” her children from 
being exposed to the violence perpetrated against the mother by her male partner, but never did 
the Ministry seek a CCO on the basis of a man failing to protect his children from violence 
(either male or female).
160
 
 In many cases, the presence of male violence in the home was one of the primary 
grounds on which the Director sought a CCO. The Director may also argue that a mother’s past 
history of “choosing” abusive partners is indicative of a future risk of harm to the child, as if 
choosing violent partners is something a woman does deliberately.
161
    
Cases involving domestic violence are particularly challenging because in some of these 
situations, the child may be at serious risk of harm and thus may need to be removed from the 
home,
162
 at least temporarily, while supports are provided to the mother.  The high number of 
CCO’s in these cases demonstrate how seriously violence is taken by judges in the context of 
child protection.  We acknowledge that witnessing the abuse of their mothers is harmful for 
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children, although we question whether permanent removal of the child is the only solution.  
Two concerns arise from these cases.  First, women are blamed for the violence against them as 
if it is an immutable personality flaw that is determinative of their fitness to parent.
163
 Scholars 
have written about the tendency to hold women responsible for failing to prevent violence 
perpetrated against them in the context of domestic violence,
164
 sexual assault,
165
 and criminal 
harassment
166
 and some cases reflect this view in the child protection context. Second, 
inadequate attention is given to the connection between poverty and lack of housing, on the one 
hand, and the inability to escape domestic violence on the other. A lack of housing options puts 
women facing male violence in a particularly difficult dilemma. They are expected to leave their 
violent partners to protect their children and yet may have no safe housing option.
167
 Removing 
the child from the mother is seen as an easier solution than protecting the mother from violence.  
Little concern is shown for the mother’s safety even though, in the majority of cases, she is the 
sole target of the abuse.  Nor is there a recognition that protecting the mother from violence also 
protects the child from being exposed to it. 
Removing children to protect them from witnessing abuse raises complex questions about 
how responsibility for preventing violence against women should be allocated between the state, 
society, and the individual. Other authors have demonstrated the ways in which the current 
climate of neoliberal policy-making, particularly those policies concerned with “downloading” 
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responsibilities from state to individual, disproportionately impact already marginalized 
individuals and communities.
168
 In the child protection context, the burden of removing children 
on the basis of witnessing domestic abuse falls heavily on women living in poverty, those who 
are living with disability, and those who are Indigenous. 
 In a number of cases, the Director made return of children contingent upon a mother 
leaving an abusive spouse and/or courts cited a mother’s failure to leave an abusive partner as a 
ground for granting a CCO. For example, in BN and DW,
169
 the mother’s partner beat her in front 
of her child and Ministry staff insisted that she leave the abuser to prevent the child from being 
exposed to violence. The partner also violently spanked the child, leading to criminal charges.  In 
granting a CCO, the judge criticized the mother for maintaining contact with her partner even 
after the child had been removed and for her “lack of attention to services available to reduce 
risk to her and her children”.170 Yet the mother indicated that she stayed with the abuser because 
she had “nowhere else to go.”171 In APM and KAB, 172 the Director cited “domestic violence” as 
a key concern and pointed to the mother’s failure to follow through on attending a course “in 
order to deal with the continuing violent relationships in which she has been engaged”. 173 The 
Director’s concerns also included the mother’s “housing instability” as she had no fixed address 
and was essentially homeless and living in shelters. However, the decision contains no 
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suggestion that poverty or lack of housing might also explain the mother’s difficulty in leaving 
her violent boyfriend.
174
  
 Women are at greatest risk of being assaulted and even killed by violent male partners 
when they leave or attempt to leave a relationship.
175
 Thus, when the state requires a woman to 
leave her relationship in order to maintain custody of her children, it is particularly important that 
the state ensure her safety in doing so.  In fact, police and other social support systems too often 
fail to protect women and to provide necessary resources to make leaving a realistic option.
176
 
Providing safe housing to a woman who is trying to escape violence should be an absolute 
requirement on the part of the state before removing a child.
177
  
The child protection system can create a Catch-22 for a woman who is deciding whether 
to report violence against her.  A mother who fears that her child may be removed from her care 
is less likely to report the violence.  This fear is not unfounded. A number of the child protection 
investigations and removals in this study began with a report of domestic violence.
178
 
Mental disability adds another dimension to the gendered dynamics of domestic violence 
in child protection cases. Women with disabilities experience intimate partner violence at 
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significantly higher rates than women without disabilities.
179
 Of the 39 cases involving mothers 
identified in our sample as being victims of intimate partner violence, 36 of the mothers were 
also identified as having either a history of addiction, a mental disability or both.
180
 Moreover, 
not only do women with disabilities experience intimate partner violence at higher rates,
181
 but 
they may experience intimate partner violence differently than women who do not have 
disabilities,
182
 in part due to the unique barriers women with disabilities face in accessing support 
and community resources when dealing with intimate partner violence.
183
 Women with 
disabilities may have difficulty in making contact with shelters or other services. They are more 
likely to be financially dependent on their abusers and leaving a violent partner might involve 
losing financial security and housing.
184
 They may also feel that they are more likely to be 
disbelieved by the police and judges should they complain about the violence against them and 
are unlikely to have a high level of trust that they will be protected from harm.  Ironically, 
women with mental disabilities are less likely to be believed in criminal courts as victims of male 
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violence, yet those same claims of violence are often the basis for removing their children in the 
child protection context.
185
 
The prevalence of domestic violence in these cases is alarming and speaks powerfully to 
the intersection of poverty, disability and gender.  The failure of the criminal justice system to 
respond adequately to male violence against women only aggravates the impact on women in the 
child protection system who are seeking to retain custody of their children.
186
 So long as we 
blame domestic violence on its victims, and fail to provide material supports like safe housing 
for these women, it is likely that they will continue to lose their children. It is to this question of 
support that we now turn. 
(v) Failures of State Support 
 
A central question about support services looms large in so many of these cases: to what 
degree is the state responsible for providing the necessary supports that would enable mothers to 
parent their children.  We focus on two issues.  First, what is the extent of the state obligation to 
support mothers who are struggling to raise their children and second, what is the appropriate 
response of the courts where women are not cooperative in accepting and following through with 
Ministry supports?  This latter question arises most often in the context of “soft supports” such as 
parenting or other programs the Ministry believes could improve the mother’s parenting or 
change her “lifestyle”. 
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The CFCSA states as a Guiding Principle that “(c) if, with available support services, a 
family can provide a safe and nurturing environment for a child, support services should be 
provided”.187 As it stands, available support services presumably vary widely depending on 
location in the province.  While courts are clear that the state obligation to provide supports is 
not unlimited, the extent of the state obligation remains unclear. 
Judges often refer to the lack of support uncritically as if it is a fact of the mother’s life 
and not a more systemic failure.  In RM,
188
 the young Indigenous mother had an intellectual 
disability.  The judge described her situation as follows: 
She is in a particularly difficult situation because she is of such limited 
intellectual or social abilities, not meaning to be harsh to her, that employment is 
a real difficulty for her.  I cannot imagine, in a time when [sic] British Columbia 
where unemployment rates are often in the ten percent range and where they are 
in the sixty or seventy percent on most aboriginal reserves, that RM would ever 
be able to obtain a job.  Because she cannot meet the requirements for social 
assistance, having not been away from her parents for two years, her financial 
life is unimaginable.  How R has managed to avoid the world of the homeless or 
the drug addicted or life on East Hastings is a bit of a miracle.  As I say, I cannot 
imagine anyone employing her.  If she survives the two years to social 
assistance, she can only do it either by selling the virtues of a young woman or 
being involved in serial relationships with others who can provide some of her 
basic needs for at least shelter and food.  The latter appears to be the case.
189
 
 
Here the judge speculates that this young Indigenous mother with a disability may have to turn to 
prostitution to support her child rather than demanding anything of the state in the way of 
resources. Her relationships are described merely as a means of obtaining her basic needs for 
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shelter and food. Aside from the obvious disrespect towards this mother in this passage, the 
state’s responsibility for this woman’s dreadful circumstances is not acknowledged.   
As we have described above, women are often blamed for unstable or lack of appropriate 
housing or other resources, which are constructed as lifestyle choices rather than as a failure on 
the part of the state.
190
 For example, in SG where stable housing was an issue, finding a home for 
a family of five was acknowledged as a significant challenge: 
As to the Director’s concern that these parents lack stable housing, this is of 
some significance.  From early on, the Director and the various social workers 
involved in this case stressed the need on the part of his parents to establish a 
stable residence appropriate for a family of five. …  The parents achievement of 
this goal of stable housing has been negatively affected by a number of factors, 
including talk of living separate and apart, lack of income, perhaps the father’s 
criminal background, probably a lack of supply of housing within their budget, 
and I think based on all the evidence I have heard and reviewed, feeling on the 
part of both parents of being overwhelmed by the demands of the whole process 
of seeking reunification with their children.
191
 
 
The case law suggests that there are limits on how much support can be provided to 
facilitate a mother’s ability to care for her children. The decision in AJ, for example, cites an 
earlier case indicating limits to state obligations to support women in their role as mothers: 
Cases dealing with the mental capacity of a parent to properly look after his/her 
child must be looked at individually. There are cases where, with proper 
support, such a parent can adequately care for a child. Such support resources 
are not infinite, but where reasonably possible they should be applied. If the 
level of support resources required to properly meet the protection concerns of a 
child becomes too high, then it cannot be said that the parent has the capacity to 
meet the child's needs. The support services should not become the primary 
caregiver for the child.
192
 
 
At some point, then, the level of support needed will be seen as so significant that it undermines 
the mother’s status as primary caregiver.  The difficult question is how to determine what 
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constitutes a “reasonable” level of support and at what point the needs of the mother for support 
become so great that removing the child is seen as preferable to providing more support?  The 
notion that a certain level of support may render a parent no longer the “primary caregiver” has 
concerning implications for persons with disabilities to be parents, particularly if they are poor.  
What it means to be a parent is understood strictly in relation to a norm that does not include 
disability, but rather one in which autonomy and independence from state support are understood 
as hallmarks of “good” parenthood.  For example, the fact that a woman who is quadriplegic may 
need support with virtually all physical aspects of parenting does not, and should not, undermine 
her role as mother and as primary caretaker.  The question of how much is too much arises most 
starkly in cases where a woman requires significant one-on-one support over a long period of 
time in order to parent her child.  When the support needs reach this level, judges are more likely 
to order a CCO. 
The individualistic focus on primary care could easily be extended to preclude the 
appointment of a person to assist the parent, even when it may enable the parent to remain in the 
child's life.
193
 Yet in the context of post-separation parenting, shared parenting of some sort is 
generally preferred with the goal of keeping each parent involved with the child, even when one 
parent has been less than fully committed to the child's care in the past.
194
 In the child protection 
context, in contrast, even where there are potential shared parenting relationships within the 
mother’s own family, they may be rejected by courts.  For example, in MDC, both the paternal 
grandparents and the maternal aunt were parties to the application seeking custody of the two 
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children involved, although the grandparents only sought custody of the one child who was their 
granddaughter.  The expert witness was “satisfied that both parents are genuinely interested in 
assuming responsibility” and noted that the parents would benefit from home care and regular 
respite.
195
 However significant support would be required for the mother to raise her children: 
Dr. Lea was very pointed and direct in his opinion that the mother was not 
capable of parenting children on her own.  He said that she would require the 
assistance of an individual who would be dedicated to giving the next fourteen 
to sixteen years to help the mother and to be prepared to do the heavy lifting in 
parenting.
196
   
 
In fact, the mother was already receiving help from friends and family with a number of tasks 
and clearly her family was motivated to support her in parenting.  However, in their testimony 
the family members downplayed the amount of support the mother required, perhaps because 
they believed that this would help her to retain custody.  Although the aunt was willing to assist 
her sister, the judge concluded that she did not have enough insight into her sister’s 
“shortcomings and failures” as a parent197 and criticized her for wanting the mother to be the 
primary caregiver.
198
 The judge was not willing to separate the girls and thus ruled out the 
application by the grandparents even though there could be no guarantee that the children would 
be kept together after a CCO.  No consideration was given to the possibility of combining 
resources amongst these various parties.  Instead the Director’s plan to find adoptive parents for 
the two children was accepted without scrutiny.  In ordering that her relationship with her 
children be permanently severed, the judge made the following comments: 
I cannot help but have a level of sympathy for the mother.  I recognize that in 
her own mind the mother genuinely believes she can provide a good home for 
these two young children.  The mother needs to be commended for maintaining 
her contact with Ms. McAllister and taking some steps to bring some stability to 
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her life.  I am also mindful that the visits with the children have generally been 
positive and that Ms. M.  clearly loves her children.  However, there is clearly a 
significant difference between caring for children during 1 to 2 hour a week 
supervised access visits and parenting children on a full-time basis.
199
 
 
The fact that the children were removed from her care at birth meant that the mother had never 
had an opportunity to bond with the children nor to demonstrate whether she could, with support, 
parent them.  It was not her choice to only see her children on supervised access visits. 
In several other cases, the idea of a full-time support worker was rejected out of hand. For 
example, in BG and VK,
200
 the court referred to a psychologist’s report stating that the mother 
would need a  "responsible adult to ride shotgun over her parenting almost continuously".
201
 The 
judge clearly believed that this requirement meant that a CCO was inevitably the appropriate 
outcome.  Similarly, in CDS,
202
 the court observed:  
It is clear that she has periods where she functions better than at other times, but 
even when she is functioning at what would appear to be her highest level, in my 
view she is not functioning to a level which would permit her to parent even 
with supports in place.  She would effectively need a 24-hour-a-day co-parent in 
order to raise a child.
203
 
 
Some cases stress that the child requires “constant monitoring” and that the mother is not up to 
that task.  In LW and RW,
204
 for example, the court cited a foster parent’s evidence of what it 
would take to adequately parent the special needs child: 
 In his evidence, J.B. outlined the factors which in his opinion would make 
easier the return of the child with special needs.  Those include a two-parent 
family with one parent available at home; consistent supervision over the next 7 
to 8 years; stability in the home; consistency; a nurturing environment to address 
needs for instant gratification and the ability to provide consistent care 24 hours 
a day, 7 days a week and not simply day care.
205
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It is clear from this analysis that no single mother on her own could meet this child’s needs nor 
could any parents without significant financial resources.  This approach essentially suggests that 
a stay-at-home mother family configuration was the only way this mother could maintain her 
parental relationship.   
Beyond the question of how much support is needed, the cases reveal considerable 
concern on the part of judges with respect to the mother’s willingness to cooperate with those 
providing support.
206
  The refusal to participate in multiple parenting programs was a consistent 
theme and one that contributed significantly to decisions to remove children from their mothers. 
In addition to courses in parenting, women were advised to attend courses for drug and alcohol 
dependency, anger management, self-esteem workshops, or counseling for their choices of 
friends or partners. If they did not comply with the advice, they were criticized regardless of the 
actual connection to the parenting question.  In KLR,
207
 for example, much of the Director’s case 
in favour of the CCO was based on the mother’s failure to comply with the Director’s conditions.  
The judge described the mother’s argument that this focus was inappropriate: 
Counsel for the Respondent stresses that it is the child’s interest that needs to be 
considered first, not meeting the dictates of a powerful state agency.  He notes 
that much of the case for the Director focused on how the Respondent did not 
comply with the demands made on her by the Director, and that is not what the 
CFCSA asks the court to consider in making a decision of this nature.  He is 
critical of the Director’s position of “three strikes, you’re out” and of how the 
Director has ceased any measure that would assist in reuniting the children with 
the Respondent.  He argues that the present reality is that the Respondent is 
ready, willing and able to parent these children despite her past and despite the 
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fact that she has not done things according to how the Director would have 
liked.
208
 
 
The children were returned to the mother because she had overcome her addiction, was gainfully 
employed and in a stable relationship.
209
 
Where mothers have complied with treatment programs, but make mistakes subsequently, 
a conclusion is drawn that they have not tried hard enough or failed to adequately retain enough 
information.  It is important to consider in assessing a mother’s refusal to participate in 
programs, whether they are appropriate for her particular circumstances.  In RM,
210
 for example, 
a case involving a young Indigenous mother with an intellectual disability, the judge described 
the inevitable failure of the mother in a particular program:  
She goes into Second Stage, a housing project for young mothers who are 
having trouble parenting, and it is a loving and supporting environment.  It is 
strict.  It has rules and particularly for a young, possibly an FAE/FAS aboriginal, 
it must have been a fairly complex structure for her to cope with.  She herself 
describes her upbringing as pretty chaotic so the mere transition to Second 
Stage, even though well-intentioned, I think probably was doomed to failure.  
There, at Second Stage, within a period of a couple of weeks, RM simply 
horrified everybody who came into contact with her.  Her parenting skills were 
very, very minimal.
211
 
 
This statement surely begs the question of why this mother was put into a program where failure 
was apparently inevitable. The young mother in this case was also bounced from one social 
worker to another.  In the words of the judge “every time [she goes] to see the Director, it is a 
different face.”212 The judge stressed that the mother was not hurting her child nor exposing her 
child to violence but rather was someone who needed significant supports to parent. The judge 
acknowledged that the concept of assisted or shared parenting might have been plausible for her: 
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In an ideal world, it is a shame that R. and her child could not be placed together 
in the home of, say, a fifty-year-old Nisga grandmother of strong character and 
who, with the power of a matrilineal society, would be able to simultaneously 
raise them together so that R. would be able to have those bonds of ties and 
affection with her child, yet her special needs could be met while the child could 
be raised in safety and security
213
 
 
This privatization of the responsibility to provide adequate supports meant that because no 
family member was available, a CCO was granted to the Director.  No expectation was made that 
the Director should support or help develop a shared parenting agreement. 
 In TN, a case involving a 21-year-old Indigenous mother,
214
 the Director sought a CCO 
for a two-year old child, citing “the mother's limited intellect, her chaotic lifestyle, her lack of 
family support and her inability to absorb and benefit from the numerous programs and help that 
have been made available to her”.215  Much of the evaluation of the mother was based on her 
lack of enthusiasm for, and irregular attendance at, parenting programs.  She was repeatedly 
criticized for spending time focusing on her own daily crises as opposed to the goals of the 
parenting program.   
 The mother in this case may well have struggled to be the sole caretaker of the child in 
question but no other options were explored.  She had a significant intellectual disability and was 
sent to multiple parenting programs, shuffled among multiple social workers, and criticized for 
paying attention to the (not insignificant) problems in her own life. Despite the extensive 
involvement of social services in her life, there is little evidence that material supports were 
provided, such as help within the home, stable housing and so on.  One of the parental capacity 
assessments concluded that the mother was able to parent and nurture her son and focused on the 
progress that she had made in overcoming an abusive childhood and in remaining clean and 
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sober.  As the court describes, this assessor was critical of how the Ministry had interacted with 
the mother:  
The ministry’s approach to Ms. T.N. failed to appreciate her limiting deficits 
and an inherent aboriginal distrust of the child protection authorities.  Dr. Howes 
felt that there are too many social workers and that too much information was 
given to Ms. T.N. She said that expectations were unrealistic.  She was of the 
view that existing aboriginal agencies would assist T.N. and that these agencies 
would be the best source of ongoing support for her.
216
  
 
The judge also noted that the mother had connected to her aboriginal culture and that the 
aboriginal community agencies were available to help her parent. Nonetheless, another maternal 
capacity report was accepted over this more encouraging one and the judge concluded that the 
mother was unable to care for her child. While some of the parenting programs were apparently 
culturally appropriate, no mention was made of whether they were appropriate for a mother with 
a significant intellectual disability. Instead, the mother was held solely responsible for her failure 
to comprehend and retain what was being taught.
217
   
Nor are judges rigorous about requiring evidence that such programs have a high 
“success” rate in terms of helping people escape violence, drug addiction and poverty.  Rather, it 
is assumed that these programs work and that parents who fail to cooperate are correspondingly 
unfit to parent.
218
 In the context of domestic violence, it is assumed that male violence can be 
dealt with simply by teaching women not to choose abusive men.  In BP,
219
 a CCO was granted 
on the basis that the mother had made bad “choices” about men, and she used marijuana.  It was 
important to the judge that she would not go to counselling to deal with her problem in choosing 
inappropriate partners:  
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Although she is without a partner at present and says she won't let someone else 
control her life that way again, she has done nothing to change what was in her 
to pick out such a partner and to stick with him. This refers, of course, to the 
lack of long term counselling.
220
  
The cases reveal little evidence of judges questioning the validity of a program or treatment 
generally or the reasons to expect it to be successful in the particular case. Nor do judges 
interrogate whether a particular program was well-suited for the woman in question given either 
her level of intellectual functioning or other disability and her culture.  
Women who do not accept help from treatment programs thus fare poorly in the child 
protection system. As we have seen, distrust by many of the women in our sample of soft 
supports, such as parenting courses or counselling, often results in mothers rejecting offers by the 
state of this type of assistance.  This distrust and lack of participation in turn can result in women 
being labelled uncooperative, which may lead to negative inferences being drawn about their 
capacity to parent.  The final trigger for the CCO application may be something that is not 
inherently harmful to the child but rather something that demonstrates the mother’s lack of 
cooperation with the Ministry, such as leaving the jurisdiction with the child.
221
 
Implicit in these decisions is the suggestion that any conscientious parent would agree to 
participate in whatever programs the Ministry recommends. Yet these refusals must be seen in 
the context of the lives of women who have been subject to high levels of state surveillance and 
intervention, and repeated judgments about their various inadequacies, especially as mothers.  
Requests for support may in fact be what triggered past child apprehensions.  Many mothers 
understandably see the Ministry and related “helping professionals” with skepticism and distrust.  
Given that the Ministry may have removed a woman's children multiple times and, in many 
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cases, removed the woman herself from her own mother, it is not surprising that social workers 
may be seen not as a source of support but rather as a potential threat.  This suspicion may be 
particularly apt for Indigenous women given the long history of state intervention and dislocation 
of Indigenous children at the hands of child protection authorities.
222 
Conclusions  
 
Several trends in the case law are particularly troubling.  First, child protection law is not 
supposed to be interpreted in a way that compares a child’s actual family situation to that of 
another family that may be superior due, for instance, to more economic resources.
223
 If this 
approach prevailed, children with disabilities could often be removed from the care of poor, 
single women and given to families with greater economic resources.  As one judge noted, “if it 
were a competition between the foster mother, and the biological mother… rarely would we 
return the children [to their mother].”224 Instead, a child is only supposed to be removed because 
of a parent’s absence or harm (or risk of harm) to a child or inability or unwillingness to care for 
the child.
225
 In practice, however, comparisons seem to occur, for example, to what a foster 
parent can offer.  In cases involving children who have been identified as “special needs”, in 
particular, comparison to more affluent parents and their capacity for “extraordinary” parenting 
may be explicit.  A child should be placed with his or her parent if that is a safe option even 
though there may be a family better equipped to care for the particular child.  For instance, the 
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court in TR was willing to concede that care by the mother was better than a stranger adoption: 
“If our society is not prepared to maintain the current very high level foster placement, then this 
Court is convinced that the mother should be given one last chance” and willing to acknowledge 
the tremendous gains the mother had made in pulling her life together.
226
 Yet because an existing 
foster family was prepared to adopt, the child was not returned to the mother.  
Second, there appears to be an unspoken assumption that children who are apprehended 
by the state will end up in “better” circumstances than those from which they were removed.  
The overwhelming majority of these cases do not mention the risks of children in care being 
shuttled from one foster home to another, living alone in hotels or children dealing with the 
trauma of losing a parent and possibly their extended family.  Nor is the potential for abuse, 
sexual violence and neglect in state care mentioned. The idea that children will necessarily thrive 
if taken from their mothers is simply false.
227
 The fact that almost 1/3 of the mothers in our study 
had themselves been in state care as children demonstrates the intergenerational impact of the 
child protection system on families.  Third, and related to the second, judges do not require a 
high degree of specificity about the plan for the child’s future after the CCO is ordered.  The 
cases contain vague statements like the Director “hopes” to keep multiple children together in the 
adoption process, but rarely is there any certainty that the children will be placed in a permanent 
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home or that siblings will be kept together.
228
 Particularly given the high number of children with 
“special needs", and the difficulty in placing such children for adoption, many will remain in the 
foster care system until they age out.   
Finally, perhaps the most dominant theme in these cases is that women are blamed and 
found responsible for the desperate social circumstances in which they find themselves, often 
related to poverty, mental disability/addiction, homelessness, male violence, the 
intergenerational impact of the child protection system and the tragic legacy of residential 
schools and the removal of Indigenous children from their families.
229
 A pervasive and long-
standing ideology that blames mothers for anything that is seen as wrong with their children 
influences judicial decision-making in various legal fields.
230
  Marlee Kline also argued that this 
individualized approach to responsibility means that child protection workers are trained to find 
solutions for a mother’s problematic activity rather than to “develop responses to problems of 
poverty, racism, and violence, and the way these affect women’s lives.”231 Mothers in the CCO 
decisions that we studied are expected to always put their children’s interests above their own, 
while at the same time they are expected to work hard to improve their own, often dismal, 
circumstances.  This standard is particularly difficult to meet for women who are struggling with 
poverty, mental disability/addiction, and male violence, as so many mothers in our study were. 
By the time mothers arrive at this final stage of the child protection process, their parental status 
has already been seriously undermined through previous apprehensions, court orders, and reports 
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that criticize their parenting.  They may be blamed for not bonding with their children despite the 
fact that they may have rarely, and sometimes never, had custody of those children or have only 
spent time with them under strict supervision in very limited settings.  They are also blamed for 
failure to cooperate with the very Ministry that is attempting to remove their children. 
In her 1995 article, Professor Mosoff recommended, quite modestly, “simply that judges 
act as they do on other matters and scrutinize the evidence of experts in child welfare cases with 
the same rigour as they would in other proceedings.”232 We would also suggest that more 
attention needs to be paid to the possibility of support systems that might allow more mothers to 
be parents to their children.
233
 A mother’s relationship to her child should only be severed when 
remaining with her is an utterly unacceptable option; not where remaining with the mother is 
simply not the best option. Safe and affordable housing may allow women to escape from violent 
relationships.  Child care and adequate respite for single mothers can be key, as well as advocacy 
in facilitating access to various social support systems.  Where possible, some form of shared 
parenting between a mother and a relative or foster parent can also be a positive strategy.
234
  
Leaving a child with his or her parent may sometimes involve a certain amount of risk in 
the sense that one cannot be certain that a parent will be able to rise to the occasion.  We believe 
that, in calculating that risk, and in assessing whether it is too great to warrant leaving the child 
with the mother, the risks that are involved in removing children from their parents must also be 
weighed in the balance. Instead of a one-sided calculation, where only one type of risk is 
examined by the courts, judges need to demand more evidence that the risks of apprehension will 
not harm the child.  As one judge astutely noted, “the best of foster care is not always better than 
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a sub-par home with a natural parent.”235 Acknowledging the risks to children that can 
accompany CCOs, and the devastating intergenerational effects of the child protection system on 
families, might lead policy makers to be more willing to go further with respect to material and 
other supports to keep families together.  By examining risks, we do not mean comparing the 
advantages of another family over that of the mother, but rather avoiding the assumption that the 
child will end up in a safe environment if removed from the mother. 
Overall, our findings support the recommendations of others
236
 that better child 
protection practices and outcomes cannot be accomplished simply through legislative changes, 
but also require the resolution of social problems that have been named many times: addressing 
women’s and children’s poverty; providing necessary services for survivors of abuse and people 
with disabilities; dealing with Aboriginal claims for self-determination. We also urge that courts 
be given more power under the CFCSA to order that additional services be provided to support 
parents.  A judge should not be permitted to order a CCO until he or she is confident that all 
support options have been exhausted.  Recognizing the difficult decisions that must often be 
made in these cases, we would urge that judges do whatever remains in their power to ensure 
that, where possible, children remain in the care of their mothers. 
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